Introduction
11 November 2009 is the 10 th anniversary of the House of Lords Act 1999, the Act which, following an amendment tabled by Lord Weatherill, expelled all but 92 of the hereditary peers from the House of Lords. This Act was always going to be "stage one" of the reforms and the retention of a small number of hereditary peers was, as noted by Lord Irvine LC, designed to act as a guarantor of further reform in stage 2 (1999a, col 207). The 2009-2010 session of Parliament will also see legislation "to complete the process of removing the hereditary principle from the second chamber" and "a draft bill for a smaller and democratically constituted second chamber" (Brown 2009, col 24) , thereby breaching the agreement behind the Weatherill amendment which was "negotiated between Privy Councillors on Privy Council terms and binding in honour on all those who have come to give it their assent" (Lord Irvine, 1999a, col 207) .
These new proposals are the latest in a long line of White Papers and discussion documents (e.g. White Paper 2008 , White Paper 2007 , White Paper 2001 , DCA 2003 since stage one reform. In the House of Commons debate following the publication of the 2008 White Paper on reform of the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Jack Straw MP, agreed that the 100 th anniversary of the Parliament Act 1911 would be a good target for getting the reform legislation onto the statute books -but considered that the process would be most unlikely to be complete by then (2008, col. 27 ). The Parliament Act 1911 was passed following the House of Lords rejection of the Liberal government"s budget of 1909 and the subsequent failure of cross-party talks on reform to come to an agreement. Rather than deal with the question of composition then, the government decided simply to limit the delaying power of the House of Lords to two sessions, stating in the preamble that it "intended to substitute for the House of Lords as it at present exists a Second Chamber constituted on a popular instead of hereditary basis, but such substitution cannot be immediately brought into operation". The fact that that two-stage reform remained incomplete was instrumental in the adoption of the Weatherill amendment (Lord Cranborne 1999, cols.221-222) , as the remaining 92 hereditary peers would act as an impetus on the Labour party to progress to stage 2.
However, those are just two of the recent or forthcoming significant anniversaries of attempts (both successful and unsuccessful) to reform the upper chamber -and while the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice may consider the centenary of the Parliament Act 1911 to be a good target date, an analysis of some of the other anniversaries may prove to be more instructive.
2008 saw the centenary of the Roseberry Report, the 90 th anniversary of the Bryce Report, the 50 th anniversary of the Life Peerages Act 1958, the 40 th anniversary of the 1968 White Paper, and the 30 th anniversary of the Home Committee. Coming up is not only the centenary of the Parliament Act 1911, but this year sees the 60 th anniversary of its amending Act, the Parliament Act 1949, and the 10 th anniversary of the Wakeham Commission itself (the pre-cursor to the current White Paper and its two predecessors). There are some common aspects within these attempted reforms, not least the difficulty in attaining consensus and the inclusion of an appointed element.
As with the current White Paper, the report of Viscount Bryce"s committee in 1918, as well as those of Lord Home (1978) and of Lord Wakeham"s Royal Commission (2000) , proposed some form of hybrid house. Bryce favoured a composition whereby approximately 75 per cent would be indirectly elected by MPs in regional groups, with the remainder being a dwindling number of hereditary peers and bishops and an increasing number of other appointees; Home preferred 60 per cent to be elected, either directly or indirectly, thereby enhancing legitimacy while maintaining some continuity, history and breadth of interest and experience; whereas Wakeham proposed a "significant minority" (p.8) of regional elected members (between 12 per cent and 35 per cent depending on which of their three models was used) with the remainder being appointed. Although the Wakeham Report informed "above all" the discussions leading to the current White Paper (Straw 2008, col.21 ) and although its principles of composition were accepted by the Government in 2000 (Russell & Cornes 2001, p.99) , its recommendations on composition have been inverted, following the decision to take the votes in the House of Commons in March 2007 as indicating that only a wholly elected House or an 80 per cent elected house should merit consideration. All of these reform proposals would have constituted, or constitute, a revolutionary change to the House, and all the historic plans have failed to come to fruition, but all have accepted that appointment brings with it some benefits to the House (see e.g. Wakeham 2000, paras. 11.19 and 11.29 and White Paper 2008, para.6.14) . To a large extent, these are the same benefits that the introduction of life peers either brought to the House or enhanced.
The Introduction of Life Peerages
Life peerages had been a feature of many reform attempts in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries (there were second readings of bills by e.g. Lord Russell in 1869, Lord Salisbury in 1888 and Lord Rockley in 1935), following the ruling in the Wensleydale Case (1856) 5 HLC 958; 10 ER 1181 that Sir James Parke, who had been created a baron for life so as to inject legal knowledge into the House, was not in fact entitled to sit in the House of Lords. The solution in that case was to give Sir James Parke, a noted judge who was by then in his mid-70s and who had no male heir, a hereditary barony. Judicial peers went on to be introduced by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 and they were granted life tenure 11 years later by section 2 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1887. It took some 70 years after that, for life peerages to be granted in general. While the power of appointment has some clear advantages, there are also some significant, and commonly cited, drawbacks. The increased power of prime ministerial patronage was one of a number of criticisms of the 1968 White Paper. This White Paper proposed a different sort of hybrid house with two tiers of members: those who could vote and those who could only sit and speak. There would be some 230 voting peers whereas those who had previously inherited their title, those aged over 72 and those who did not play an active part in the House would not be eligible to vote but could otherwise take part in activities (but there would be no such right to sit for those who subsequently inherited a title). Other principles included that the government was to be given a small majority over the opposition, but not an overall majority due to the presence of the number of Crossbenchers, and the power of delay was to be reduced to 6 months.
The removal of the hereditary peers (whose presence helped to dissolve the power of patronage), the inequity in there being second-class members, the complexity of determining who was a voting member, the possible tendency to increase the use of the reduced power of delay (in inverse proportion to its strength) and the existence of many other issues, of greater importance to the Labour party and to the electorate, that should be dealt with instead were just some of the criticisms levied at the proposals (Baroness Asquith of Yarnbury 1968, col.696; Lord Gardiner LC 1968, col. 646; Lord Coneford 1968, col. 792; Dorey 2006, pp. 604-607 Now nearly ten years on from the stage one reform, it is clear that stage two has indeed been slow in coming. While there has undoubtedly been a lot of work, with the report of the Royal Commission and now three White Papers, further actual reform appears to remain almost continually on the horizon and no closer. However, the length of time -well over twice that envisaged by Lord Irvine (1999b, col 24) -gives a greater opportunity to look at the "transitional" house.
As noted above, the House of Lords can now claim to be more representative in its composition, in terms of gender and ethnicity, than the House of Commons (and in terms of ethnicity than the body of local councils). Whereas the old House of Lords had a Conservative bias, there are now similar numbers of Labour, Conservative and Cross-bench peers (215, 202 and 203 respectively as of 30 June 2008). This increase in balance has coincided with an increase in the assertiveness of the House of Lords (government defeats in the years following the passage of the House of Lords Act 1999 have risen on average by around 50 per cent to almost 60 defeats a session (White Paper 2008, para. 2.5)). The process of election has also had an effect on the hereditary peers" comparative attendance. Previously decried as backwoodsmen, the average attendance figures for the "Weatherill" hereditary peers far exceeds that of the life peers. In the parliamentary session 1998/99, the hereditary peers" average attendance was just under two-thirds that of the average life peer whereas in the sessions following the passing of the House of Lords Act 1999 the Weatherill hereditary peers" average is regularly around 130 per cent of that of the average life peer. However, while stage one reform has redressed a number of concerns, the Labour government officially remains committed to introducing stage two reform. Following the revolt of their own backbench to their proposals, the Labour government then adopted a cross-party approach. This initially led to seven options (from wholly appointed through to wholly elected) being placed before Straw", Birmingham Evening Mail, July 16, 2008) . Although it is a government White Paper it is again the product of cross-party discussions and there are areas where there has been no agreement (e.g. whether to use first-past-the-post or another electoral system and, if an 80 per cent elected house is chosen, the presence of Bishops and the status of the appointments commission). However, it is clear that the powers of the House of Lords should not be reduced (White Paper 2008, chapter 5) despite there earlier having been proposals to limit scrutiny of bills to just 60 days and, as with the 1968 White Paper, cut the power to delay to 6 months (Dorey, 2006, p.617) .
Among the more concrete reforms is the proposal that elected members of the reformed House should serve 12-15 year terms and not be available for re-election (an idea designed to enhance independence which has been a feature of many other reform proposals, e.g. Wakeham and Bryce). The government also proposes that members should be salaried and, while leaving the fine detail open, proposes on principle that members" salary should be less than that of MPs but more than that of members of devolved legislatures (which would mean at today"s prices that a member elected for 12 years would receive some £600,000). The method of election, the transitional arrangements (with three possibilities considered with final end dates ranging from 2020 to 2040) and, less intractably, the presence of both Bishops (which is opposed by the Liberal Democrats but which otherwise is either accepted or does not attract forceful opposition, according to the study by Harlow, Cranmer and Doe 2008) and retired Justices of the Supreme Court 3 all remain open. Although the White Paper does not decide on whether the reformed House should be wholly or 80 per cent elected, it does note the difficulty of including an independent element within a wholly elected chamber (para 6.12).
Despite the preamble to the Parliament Act 1911, an appointed element has been a key feature of many reform proposals from Bryce 90 years ago to Home 30 years ago and Wakeham 10 years ago, as well those over the last 10 years. As Phillipson (2004, pp.352-354) notes, hybridity seemed to be favoured by the government until just before the February 2003 indicative votes on composition when it was described by Lord Irvine LC, among others, as a "nonsense" and a "parliamentary disaster". Nevertheless, the debate has been over how big the elected and appointed elements should be (from Wakeham"s 12 per cent-35 per cent to the Public Administration Select Committee"s 80 per cent via the government"s original 20 per cent). However, the debate over election versus appointment, and as to the proportions of a hybrid House, may well be a false dichotomy.
A False Dichotomy?
Following on from last year"s 50 th anniversary of the Life Peerage Act and this year"s 10 th anniversary of the House of Lords Act, arguably both very valuable and successful reforms, a "Weatherill 2" system -extending the principle of the Weatherill hereditaries to Life Peers (but with the numbers of party peers changing according to, for example, either general or local election results) -could provide a combination of the benefits of election and appointment while mitigating some of the problems with both.
It would also satisfy all the principles which, in framing the as well as the addition in the July 2008 that "the second chamber should take account of the prevailing political view amongst the electorate, but also provide opportunities for independent and minority views to be represented" (White Paper 2008, p.4) .
Such a system would bear a resemblance to that proposed by the Roseberry report (the 80 th anniversary of which was last year) 4 but with a democratic difference. Roseberry proposed that the House of Lords should consist of a number of representative peers elected by peers (according to type of peerage) along with those peers who had held high office, elected bishops, Lords of Appeal in Ordinary and a small number of life peers. The idea foundered due to a fatal defect, from the Liberal"s point of view, as it entrenched a Tory majority and removed their ability to threaten to flood the House of Lords with new members (Holland 1912, pp.52-53) . There is no such majority today. Rather than having peers elected according to type (e.g. so many Dukes, so many Marquesses, etc.), as with Roseberry, or the Weatherill system of each party"s hereditary peers electing, in 1999, 10 per cent of their number to represent them (with subsequent by-elections), the number of sitting peers for the political parties would vary according to recent election results. The number of cross-bench peers could be fixed close to the current level and thus provide a far greater independent element than the 2008 White Paper, with its maximum of 20 per cent appointees, could allow. The election of peers from within their own number to fill the parties" allocations would avoid the house growing to such a gargantuan size which would, as Hazell and Seyd (1998, p.383) illustrate, be inherent in a system whereby life peerages are created to ensure proportionality between the parties. There could, however, also be a provision to allow for a small number of peers to be appointed directly to the House, for example to take up ministerial positions (as with Lady Chalker in the previous Conservative government and Lord Malloch-Brown, among others, in the current Labour government), who would then face election at the next opportunity.
It would thus take account of the prevailing political view among the electorate, whilst preserving an element of flexibility in appointment to government and maintaining a strong independent element that would contribute to ensuring that there was no overall majority for any party. The indirect election would, as stated in the July 2008 White Paper, "offer some degree of democratic legitimacy" (para.4.35). While indirect election was eschewed by the White Paper, the stated objections were the difficulties in deciding which institutions should be represented in any electoral college, the short-term nature of the secondary mandate and the similarity to appointment (paras 4.35 -4.41 ). This does would not apply to a "Weatherill 2" system as the direct electorate would be the party and cross-bench life peers and the doublelock of being made a peer and then facing election would dilute the similarity to simple appointment. Furthermore, while there would be some variation in the numbers for each party, there would be substantial continuity of membership, and, indeed, the mechanism for election could operate on the widely mooted three-term system if wanted. While indirect election does not confer as much legitimacy as direct election, it does meet the requirements of enhanced legitimacy and complementarity, does not challenge the primacy of the House of Commons in the way that a directly elected House using proportional representation might, does not risk increasing voter fatigue, and should save much of the additional £43 million pounds that the direct elections are estimated to cost (White Paper 2008, para. 9. 3).
Such a system would build on the reforms of the Life Peerage Act 1958 and House of Lords Act 1999 and be in keeping with the evolutionary changes of the House. Although there are strong and opposing views held on all sides, unlike the revolutionary changes proposed within the 2008 White Paper -and indeed earlier failed attempts such as the 1968 White Paper and the Bryce Report (1918) -the changes would be simpler, and are a development of what has already been tried and tested and proved successful, and thus there are fewer areas for contention. The system combines much of the benefits of election and appointment, allows for a greater independent element and does not create a two-tier house which hybridity risks. Moreover, it does away with the need for long and complex transitional arrangements, potentially running until the middle of this century. Instead, following the precedent of the House of Lords Act 1999, it could be a short and relatively simple Act and be in operation within weeks, or even days, of being enacted. The 100th anniversary of the 1911 Act could thus be well within sight.
